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Abstract
Population structure affects the outcome of natural selection. Static
population structures can be described by graphs, where individuals
occupy the nodes, and interactions occur along the edges. General con-
ditions for evolutionary success on any weighted graph were recently
derived, for weak selection, in terms of coalescence times of random
walks. Here we show that for a special class of graphs, the conditions
for success take a particularly simple form, in which all effects of graph
structure are described by the graph’s “effective degree”—a measure
of the effective number of neighbors per individual. This result holds
for all weighted graphs that are isothermal, meaning that the sum
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of edge weights is the same at each node. Isothermal graphs encom-
pass a wide variety of underlying topologies, and arise naturally from
supposing that each individual devotes the same amount of time to in-
teraction. Cooperative behavior is favored on a large isothermal graph
if the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the effective degree. We relate the
effective degree of a graph to its spectral gap, thereby providing a link
between evolutionary dynamics and the theory of expander graphs.
As a surprising example, we report graphs of infinite average degree
that are nonetheless highly conducive for promoting cooperation.
The structure of a population has important consequences for its evolu-
tion [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. In particular, spatial or social network structure
can promote the evolution of cooperative behavior, by allowing cooperators
to cluster together and share benefits [9, 10, 11].
Spatial structure can be represented mathematically as a graph or net-
work, in which nodes represent individuals and edges indicate spatial or social
connections [12, 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Edges can be weighted to indi-
cate the strength of the connection. To study cooperation or other forms of
social behavior, interactions can be modeled as matrix games. Individuals
play games with their neighbors, and the payoffs from these games determine
reproductive success.
Mathematical studies of evolutionary games on graphs [14, 15, 16, 19, 20,
21, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] have typically assumed that the graph is regular,
meaning that each individual has the same number of neighbors. Recently,
a condition was derived that determines which strategy is favored in any
two-player, two-strategy game, on any weighted graph, under weak selection
[27, 28]. Weak selection means that the game has only a small effect on
reproductive success. For nonweak selection, determining the outcome of
evolutionary games on graphs is NP-hard [29].
A weighted graph is called isothermal if the sum of edge weights is the
same at each vertex (Fig. 1). This property has a natural interpretation:
suppose that the edge weights represent the amount of time that two in-
dividuals interact with each other. Then the graph is isothermal as long
as each individual devotes the same total time to interaction. Importantly,
some individuals may divide their time thinly among many contacts, while
others focus their time on one or two contacts.
Isothermal graphs have special relevance for evolutionary dynamics. All
vertices of an isothermal graph have the same reproductive value—meaning
that each vertex contributes equally to the future population under neutral
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Figure 1: Isothermal graphs and their effective degrees. A graph
is isothermal if the sum of edge weights is the same for each vertex. The
effective degree κ˜ of the graph, defined in Eq. (3), determines the outcome of
evolutionary game dynamics. (A) An asymmetric isothermal graph; weights
are shown for each edge. (B) A wheel graph, with one hub and n wheel
vertices. All connections with the hub have weight 1/n. All connections
in the periphery have weight (n − 1)/2n. As n → ∞, the effective degree
approaches 2. A formula for arbitrary n is derived in Appendix G. (C) A 30-
vertex graph generated with preferential attachment [30] and linking number
m = 3. Isothermal edge weights are obtained by quadratic programming
(see Appendix H). The effective degree, κ˜ ≈ 2.47, is less than the average
topological degree, k¯ = 5.6. (D) An island model, with edges of weight
α  1 between each inter-island pair of vertices. There are two islands: (i)
a k1-regular graph of size N1 and (ii) a k2-regular graph of size N2.
drift [31, 8]. The Isothermal Theorem [6, 32] states that isothermal graphs
neither amplify nor suppress the effects of selection for mutations of constant
fitness effect.
Here we analyze evolutionary games on isothermal graphs. For this spe-
cial class of graphs, we are able to obtain more powerful results than are
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available for arbitrary weighted graphs [27, 28]. We find that, for weak se-
lection, the condition for success takes a particularly simple form, in which
all effects of graph structure are captured in a single quantity—the effective
degree. An isothermal graph of effective degree κ˜ behaves like an unweighted
κ˜-regular graph in its effect on strategy selection. In particular, cooperation
is favored on a large graph if and only if it provides a κ˜-fold benefit relative
to the cost. We derive bounds on κ˜ in terms of the graph’s spectral gap (the
difference between the two largest eigenvalues), establishing a link to the
theory of expander graphs [33, 34, 35]. Applying our results to power-law
networks and to heterogeneous subdivided populations, we exhibit graphs
of arbitrarily large average degree that provide arbitrarily strong support to
cooperation.
Model
We represent spatial structure by a weighted, connected, isothermal graph G
of size N . The edge weight between vertices i, j ∈ G is denoted wij. Without
loss of generality, we scale edge weights so that
∑
j∈Gwij = 1 for each vertex
i. In this way, edge weights may be interpreted as probabilities or frequencies
of interaction. Edges are undirected, meaning wij = wji, and there are no
self-loops: wii = 0 for each i. Two vertices are neighbors if they are joined
by an edge of positive weight; the number of neighbors of vertex i is called
its topological degree ki.
Vertices in an isothermal graph may differ widely in the distribution of
edge weights among their neighbors (Fig. 1). We quantify these differences
using the Simpson degree (Fig. 2), a measure inspired by the Simpson index
of biodiversity [36]. The Simpson degree κi of vertex i is defined as [37, 18]
κi =
(∑
j∈G
w2ij
)−1
. (1)
In words, if individual i randomly selects two neigbors, with probability
proportional to edge weight, then κi is the inverse probability that the same
neighbor is selected twice. The Simpson degree κi quantifies the expected
number of contacts of individual i, accounting for the time spent with each
contact. If all edges from vertex i have equal weight, then the Simpson and
topological degrees are equal: κi = ki. Otherwise, κi < ki, and κi decreases
as the distribution of edge weights from i becomes more uneven.
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Figure 2: Simpson degree and remeeting time. The Simpson degree
κi =
(∑
j w
2
ij
)−1
quantifies the effective number (or diversity) of neighbors
of a vertex i, taking their edge weights into account. A If the edge weights to
neighbors are nonuniform, the Simpson degree κi is less than the topological
degree ki. Here, κi = 4, which is less than the topological degree, ki = 5.
B If each neighbor has equal edge weight 1/k, the Simpson degree is equal
to the topological degree, k. C The remeeting time τi is the expected time
for two independent random walks from i to meet each other. The effective
degree κ˜ of a graph is the weighted harmonic average of the Simpson degrees,
with weights given by the remeeting times.
Individuals can be one of two types, A or B, corresponding to strategies
in the game (A B
A a b
B c d
)
. (2)
Each time-step, each individual plays the game with all neighbors. Payoffs
from the game are translated into fecundity (reproductive rate) by Fi =
1 + δfi, where fi is the edge-weighted average payoff that i receives from
neighbors, and δ is a parameter quantifying the strength of selection. We
study weak selection (0 < δ  1) as a perturbation of neutral drift (δ = 0).
Evolution proceeds according to death-birth updating [14]. First, a vertex
i ∈ G is chosen, with uniform probability, to be replaced. A neighbor j of
i is then chosen to reproduce, with probability proportional to wijFj. The
offspring of j replaces the occupant of i and inherits the type of its parent.
Birth-death updating [14] will be considered later.
Over time, one of the competing types will die out and the other will
become fixed. Consider an initial state with a single vertex of type A chosen
uniformly at random, and all other vertices of type B. We define the fixation
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probability ρA as the (expected) probability that type A becomes fixed from
this initial state. Similarly, ρB is the probability that type B becomes fixed
from an initial state with one random (uniformly chosen) vertex of type B
and all other vertices of type A. We say A is favored if ρA > ρB.
Results
Condition for success
We find that the key quantity characterizing an isothermal graph is its effec-
tive degree κ˜, a weighted harmonic average of the graph’s Simpson degrees:
κ˜ =
∑
i τi∑
i τiκ
−1
i
. (3)
The weighting τi of vertex i is the the expected remeeting time of two random
walks that are initialized at i (see Fig. 2C and Appendix B.2). Remeeting
times arise from tracing ancestries backwards in time as coalescing random
walks [38, 33, 39, 40]. The remeeting time τi is proportional to the probability
that two neighbors competing to reproduce into vertex i have different types.
We observe that if all vertices have k neighbors of equal weight, the effective
degree is equal to the topological degree: κ˜ = k.
We prove in Appendix B.3 that strategy A is favored, for weak selection
on an isothermal graph, if and only if
σa+ b > c+ σd, with σ =
κ˜+ 1− 4κ˜/N
κ˜− 1 . (4)
In this condition, all effects of graph structure are captured in the effec-
tive degree κ˜. Therefore, determining the conditions for success on a given
isothermal graph amounts to computing the effective degree. This can be
done in polynomial time by solving a system of linear equations for coales-
cence times (Appendix B.2).
As an interpretation of Condition (4), consider strategy A to represent
cooperation and B to represent defection (noncooperation). Suppose that
one’s partner is equally likely to be either type. Then the expected reduction
in one’s payoff from playing A rather than B is C = −1
2
(a+ b− c− d). This
quantity may be interpreted as the cost of cooperation. The expected increase
in one’s partner’s payoff from playing A rather than B is B = 1
2
(a−b+c−d),
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which may be interpreted as the benefit to the partner. Condition (4) then
becomes
(N/κ˜− 2)B > (N − 2)C. (5)
Suppose that B,C > 0, meaning that cooperation is costly to the actor
and beneficial to the recipient. Then for κ˜  N , cooperation is favored
as long as B/C > κ˜. Well-known results for unweighted k-regular graphs
[14, 15, 20, 18] are recovered by substituting k for κ˜. In contrast, if κ˜ ≥ N/2,
then cooperation is never favored, but spiteful behaviors (B < 0, C > 0) can
be favored.
Spectral gap bounds for expander graphs
How does the effective degree κ˜ depend on other properties of the graph? As
a first observation, since κ˜ is a weighted average, it lies between the minimum
and maximum Simpson degrees: κmin ≤ κ˜ ≤ κmax. Thus (N/κmin − 2)B >
(N − 2)C is necessary for cooperation to be favored, and (N/κmax − 2)B >
(N − 2)C is sufficient.
Stronger bounds on κ˜ can be obtained using the spectral gap of the
graph—the difference between the two largest eigenvalues of the adjacency
matrix. For isothermal graphs, the spectral gap is g = 1−λ2, where λ2 is the
second-largest eigenvalue. The spectral gap quantifies the expansion proper-
ties of a graph: how rapidly a ball grows in volume with respect to its radius,
or how quickly a random walk “forgets” its initial position [33, 34, 35]. We de-
fine an isothermal expander graph as a large (N  1) isothermal graph with
non-negligible spectral gap (g 6 1); see Appendix D.2 for a formal definition
using limits. Expander graphs have important applications in mathematics
[35] and computer science [34]. The spectral gap of an isothermal expander
graph lies in the range 0 < g ≤ 1.
We prove in Appendix C.2 that remeeting times on an isothermal ex-
pander graph are asymptotically bounded by τi ≤ N/g, for each vertex i.
We apply this result to bound the effective degree κ˜. Let κA and κH denote
the (unweighted) arithmetic and harmonic means, respectively, of the graph’s
Simpson degrees. Then the effective degree is bounded by
gκH ≤ κ˜ ≤ κA
g
. (6)
Combining with (5) we find that B/C > gκH is necessary for cooperation
to be favored on an isothermal expander graph, and B/C > κA/g is sufficient.
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Figure 3: Bounds on effective degree for power-law expander
graphs. We consider a large isothermal graph for which the Simpson degree
distribution is described by the density f(κ) ∝ κ−γ on the range [κ0,∞).
The upper and lower bounds (8) are shown for A γ = 2 and B γ = 3, both
with κ0 = 1. As g → 1, the upper and lower bounds both converge to the
(unweighted) harmonic mean Simpson degree κH .
Since the Simpson degree of a vertex cannot exceed its topological degree,
B/C > k¯/g also suffices for cooperation to be favored, where k¯ = 1
N
∑
i ki is
the arithmetic average topological degree.
Bounds (6) can be improved by considering harmonic means over quantile
ranges of the Simpson degree distribution. For 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1, let κ[a,b] denote
the harmonic mean of the Simpson degrees lying between the ath and bth
quantiles. For example, κ[0,1/4] denotes the harmonic mean over the smallest
fourth (first quartile) of Simpson degrees. The bounds in (6) can then be
sharpened to
κ[0,g] ≤ κ˜ ≤ κ[1−g,1]. (7)
As g → 1, the upper and lower bounds both converge to the harmonic mean
Simpson degree κH; thus κ˜ converges to κH as well in this limit. For the case
g > 1/2, even tighter bounds are derived in Appendix D.4.
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Figure 4: Conditions for cooperation on power-law networks. The
benefit-cost threshold (B/C)∗ = (N − 2)/(N/κ˜ − 2) is plotted against the
harmonic average Simpson degree κH, for power-law networks generated by
(A) shifted-linear preferential attachment [41, 42], and (B) the configuration
model. Isothermal edge weights are generated via quadratic programming
(see Appendix H). Each marker corresponds to a single graph. The approxi-
mation (B/C)∗ ≈ (N−2)/(N/κH−2) (solid line) works well for both models,
with deviations only for γ close to 2.
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Power-law networks
We apply our results to isothermal expander graphs with power-law degree
distribution. Let us hypothetically consider a isothermal expander graph
whose Simpson degree distribution is described by the power-law density
f(κ) ∝ κ−γ, on the range κ0 ≤ κ < ∞, for arbitrary γ ≥ 2 and κ0 ≥
1. Evaluating (7) for the corresponding quantile function, κ(x) = κ0(1 −
x)−1/(γ−1), yields(
γ
γ − 1
)
κ0g
1− (1− g)γ/(γ−1) ≤ κ˜ ≤
(
γ
γ − 1
)
κ0g
−1/(γ−1). (8)
These bounds are illustrated in Figure 3. Interestingly, for γ = 2, the effective
degree is bounded above by 2κ0/g, but the arithmetic average Simpson degree
κA diverges to infinity.
To complement these analytical results, we numerically computed the
effective degree κ˜ for random power-law networks generated by preferential
attachment and by the configuration model (Figs. 1C, 4). We find that κ˜
is in most cases well-approximated by the harmonic mean Simpson degree
κH, which is simpler to compute. It follows that the benefit-cost threshold
for cooperation, (B/C)∗ = (N − 2)/(N/κ˜ − 2), is well-approximated by
(N − 2)/(N/κH − 2). For large graphs, the condition for cooperation is
approximately B/C > κH. Note that this condition is easier to fulfill than
either B/C > κA or B/C > k¯, since κH ≤ κA ≤ k¯, with both inequalities
strict for non-regular graphs.
Island-structured populations
Let us now consider a population divided into subpopulations (“islands”)
with weak connections between them (Fig. 1D). The islands are represented
by isothermal, vertex-transitive graphs, G1, . . . , Gn, which may differ in their
size and structure. An overall isothermal graph G is formed by joining each
inter-island pair of vertices by an edge of weight α 1, and rescaling intra-
island edge weights correspondingly (see Appendix F). We prove that, if
the island sizes are equal, the effective degree κ˜ of G is the (unweighted)
harmonic mean of the Simpson degrees κ1, . . . , κn of the separate islands. If
the islands have different sizes, κ˜ is a weighted harmonic mean of κ1, . . . , κn,
with weights depending only on the islands’ sizes.
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Figure 5: Island-structured “super-promoters” of cooperation. We
use the island model (Fig. 1D) to construct families of graphs whose effective
degree κ˜ remains finite while the arithmetic average degree (either Simpson
or topological) diverges to infinity. A Two islands of equal size: a cycle
and a complete graph. As N → ∞, the effective degree κ˜ converges to 4,
which is the harmonic mean of 2 and infinity. B A small complete graph
and a large cycle with alternating edge weights, ε  1 and 1 − ε. Under
the appropriate combination of limits, κ˜ converges to 1—meaning that all
cooperative behaviors with B > C > 0 are favored—while κA diverges.
Calculations are provided in Appendix F.
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This result is significant for the evolution of cooperation. The harmonic
mean of a set of numbers is dominated by its smallest elements. There-
fore, the overall effective degree κ˜ is most strongly influenced by the islands
where the Simpson degree is smallest and cooperation is most favored. This
property allows us to design “super-promoters” of cooperation (Fig. 5), for
which the effective degree κ˜ remains small—even as small as 1—while the
arithmetic mean Simpson degree κA and topological degree k¯ both diverge
to infinity.
Birth-death updating
We now turn to the birth-death update rule. First, an individual i is chosen,
proportionally to its fecundity Fi, to reproduce. The offspring of i replaces
neighbor j with probability wij. In this case, we show in Appendix B.4 that
type A is favored for weak selection if and only if
σa+ b > c+ σd, with σ = (N − 2)/N. (9)
This same condition for success has previously been derived for well-mixed
populations, under a variety of update rules, with arbitrary selection strength
and mutation rate [43, 44, 45]. Here we have derived the same condition for
birth-death updating on any isothermal graph, under weak selection. This
result is reminiscent of the Isothermal Theorem [6, 32], which states that
the fixation probability of a mutation of constant fitness, for birth-death
updating on any isothermal graph, is the same as in a well-mixed population.
Condition (9) extends this result to evolutionary games with weak selection.
Rewriting Condition (9) as−(N−1)C−B > 0, we find that cooperation is
never favored for positive B and C. This generalizes, to all isothermal graphs,
the previous finding that birth-death updating does not support cooperation
on regular graphs [14, 15, 19, 20, 18, 23]. This effect arises because, under
birth-death updating, any aid given to a neighbor increases the chances of
being replaced by that neighbor. Thus the benefits of cooperator assortment
are exactly cancelled by local competition among cooperators [46, 19].
Discussion
Here we have derived and analyzed conditions for evolutionary game success
on weighted isothermal graphs, under weak selection. Although there ex-
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ists a general method for arbitrary weighted graphs [27, 28], our results for
isothermal graphs are noteworthy in a number of respects.
First, the conditions for success take a simple form, (4), in which all effects
of graph structure are captured in the effective degree κ˜. For large graphs,
cooperation is favored if it provides a κ˜-fold benefit relative to the cost. Since
κ˜ is a weighted harmonic (rather than arithmetic) average, the presence of
highly-connected hubs does not preclude support for cooperation. Indeed,
κ˜ can be made arbitrarily close to 1—so that any cooperation producing a
net benefit is favored—even as the average degree (topological or Simpson)
diverges to infinity.
Second, we have derived explicit bounds for the effective degree—and,
by extension, the benefit-cost threshold for cooperation—in terms of the
graph’s degree distribution and spectral gap. Whether similar bounds can
be obtained for arbitrary graphs is unknown. The appearance of the spectral
gap suggests an intriguing link between evolutionary game theory and the
theory of expander graphs. Currently, expansion properties are much bet-
ter understood for regular graphs than for non-regular graphs [33, 34, 35].
Isothermal graphs may serve as a useful class of intermediate generality for
extending expansion theorems beyond regular graphs.
Third, we have shown that for birth-death updating on an isothermal
graph, the conditions for ρA > ρB under weak selection are entirely in-
dependent of the graph structure. In particular, birth-death updating on
isothermal graphs provides no support to the evolution of cooperation, be-
cause the benefits of cooperation are exactly cancelled by local competi-
tion. Such cancellation has been previously observed for regular graphs
[14, 15, 19, 20, 18, 23] and other homogeneous population structures [46, 47].
Our result extends this finding to all isothermal graphs. Moreover, we find an
unexpected link between such cancellation effects and the Isothermal Theo-
rem [6, 32]. The common thread is that, for birth-death updating on isother-
mal graphs, key aspects of the evolutionary process are invariant with respect
to spatial structure. Importantly, for non-isothermal graphs, Condition (9) is
not generally valid, and the conditions for success under birth-death updat-
ing vary from graph to graph [48]. It therefore appears that the cancellation
effects observed here and in previous work [14, 15, 19, 20, 18, 23] are re-
stricted to isothermal graphs. The question of whether birth-death updating
can ever support cooperation on a (non-isothermal) weighted graph remains
open.
Our results add an important nuance to our understanding of the evo-
13
lution of cooperation. Previous work on regular graphs [14, 15, 16, 19, 20,
21, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] showed that cooperation thrives when each indi-
vidual has few neighbors, relative to the overall population size. Condition
(4) shows that it is not the raw number of neighbors that matters, but their
effective number, as quantified by κ˜. Even in highly interconnected societies,
cooperation can flourish if most individuals interact primarily with a few
close contacts, rather than many loose acquaintances.
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A Model and notation
We first review the model and introduce notation that will be used through-
out this Appendix.
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A.1 Isothermal graphs
Population structure is described by a weighted isothermal graph G with
weights wij. Without loss of generality we suppose
∑
j∈Gwij = 1 for each
vertex i. The graph is undirected (wij = wji for each i, j) and has no self-
loops (wii = 0 for all i). The Simpson degree of vertex i is defined as
κi =
(∑
j∈G
w2ij
)−1
.
Random walks on G are defined with step probabilities equal to edge
weights: pij = wij for each pair of vertices i and j. The probability that an
n-step random walk from i terminates at j is denoted p
(n)
ij . Note that
p
(2)
ii =
∑
j∈G
w2ij = κ
−1
i .
The stationary distribution for random walks on isothermal graphs is uni-
form: pii = 1/N for each i ∈ G.
The adjacency matrix of an isothermal graph G is symmetric and doubly
stochastic. It therefore has real eigenvalues 1 = λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λN .
Moreover, λ2 < 1 as long as G is connected. The spectral gap is defined as
g = 1− λ2.
A.2 Evolutionary process
The type occupying vertex i is denoted xi ∈ {0, 1}, with 1 corresponding
to A and 0 corresponding to B. The population state is given by the vector
x = (xi)i∈G ∈ {0, 1}G.
There are two competing types, A and B, corresponding to two strategies
in the matrix game: (A B
A a b
B c d
)
, (10)
In a given state, the edge-weighted average payoff to vertex i is denoted
fi =
∑
j∈Gwijfij, where fij is the payoff that i receives from interacting with
j according to the game.
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Payoff is translated into fecundity by Fi = 1 + δfi, where δ ≥ 0 quantifies
the strength of selection. The case δ = 0 represents neutral drift, for which
the game has no effect on selection. Weak selection is the regime 0 < δ  1.
Each time-step, an individual in a particular vertex i is chosen to repro-
duce, and the offspring replaces the occupant of another vertex j. (We will
use the shorthand “i replaces j” to describe such an event.) The offspring
inherits the type of the parent. The probability that i replaces j in a given
state depends on the specified update rule. For death-birth updating,
P[i replaces j] =
1
N
(
wijFi∑
k wkjFk
)
.
For birth-death updating,
P[i replaces j] =
(
Fi∑
k Fk
)
wij.
Note that for neutral drift (δ = 0) the probability that i replaces j is wij/N
for both update rules. This property is particular to isothermal graphs, and
does not hold for the more general class of weighted undirected graphs.
There are two absorbing states: the state 1 for which only type A is
present (xi = 1 ∀i ∈ G), and the state 0 for which only type B is present
(xi = 0 ∀i ∈ G). All other states are transient [49, Theorem 2]. We define the
fixation probability of A, denoted ρA, as the expected probability of reaching
state 1 from an initial state with a single A at a uniformly chosen random
vertex, and all other vertices having type B. Likewise, we define the fixation
probability of B, denoted ρB, as the expected probability of reaching state 1
from an initial state with a single B at a uniformly chosen random vertex,
and all other vertices having type A.
B Derivation of conditions for success
The conditions for a type to be favored on an arbitrary weighted graph, for
weak selection, were derived in Refs. [27, 50]. Here we provide a simplified
derivation for the case of isothermal graphs.
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B.1 Weak selection analysis
Define ∆(x) as the expected change in the number (absolute frequency) of
A’s from a given state x. We compute this for the two update rules:
∆(x) =

1
N
∑
j∈G
(
−xj +
∑
i∈G xiwijFi∑
k∈GwkjFk
)
for Death-Birth
∑
i∈G
(
xiFi −
∑
j∈G xjwij
)
∑
k∈G Fk
for Birth-Death.
We observe that for neutral drift (δ = 0), ∆(x) = 0 for each state x.
For weak selection, we require the derivative of ∆′(x) = d∆(x)
dδ
|δ=0. These
derivatives can be expressed as
∆′(x) =

1
N2
∑
i∈G xi
(
fi − f (2)i
)
for Death-Birth
1
N2
∑
i∈G xi
(
fi − f (1)i
)
for Birth-Death.
(11)
Above, we have introduced the notation f
(n)
i =
∑
j p
(n)
ij fj for the expected
payoff to the vertex at the end of an n-step random walk from i:
We say that A is favored under weak selection if ρA > ρB to first order
in δ. Allen and McAvoy [50] showed this criterion can be evaluated by
computing the expectation of ∆(x) over a particular probability distribution
of population states x. This distribution, called the neutral rare-mutation
conditional distribution, is obtained by (i) fixing δ = 0, (ii) introducing a
mutation probability u > 0 to obtain a stationary distribution over states,
(iii) conditioning this stationary distribution on both types being present,
and (iv) taking the u→ 0 limit. Denoting expectations over this distribution
by 〈 〉, Allen and McAvoy [50] showed that A is favored under weak selection
if and only if
〈∆′〉 > 0. (12)
B.2 Coalescence times
The conditions for success under weak selection can be expressed in terms of
coalescence times. Coalescence times are defined by considering a discrete-
time process in which two random walkers start at vertices i and j. At each
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time, one of them is chosen, with equal probability, to take a step according
to the usual step probabilities pij. We denote the positions of the walkers at
time t by the pair (Xt, Yt), where Xt and Yt are random variables with values
in G.
Suppose that the two walkers start at vertices i and j: (X0, Y0) = (i, j).
Let Mij denote the time until the walkers meet: Mij = min{t ≥ 0 : X(t) =
Y (t)}. The coalescence time is defined as τij = E[Mij]. These coalescence
times satisfy the recurrence relation
τij =
{
0 i = j
1 + 1
2
∑
k∈G (wikτjk + wjkτik) i 6= j.
(13)
For isothermal graphs, this coalescing random walk applies to both death-
birth and birth-death updating. (For arbitrary weighted graphs, a different
coalescing random walk is needed for birth-death updating.) Duality between
the the coalescing random walk and the neutral drift process [51] implies that
all vertices xi, xj, xk, and x`,
〈xixj − xkx`〉 ∝ τk` − τij. (14)
Of particular interest is the remeeting time for two walkers from the
same vertex. Suppose both walkers start at vertex i: (X0, Y0) = (i, i). Let
M+ii denote the first positive time for which the walkers occupy the same
vertex: M+ii = min{t > 0 : X(t) = Y (t)}. We define the remeeting time as
τi = E[M+ii ]. Remeeting times are related to coalescence times by
τi = 1 +
∑
j∈G
wijτij. (15)
Remeeting times satisfy a return-time identity [27], which in the isothermal
case is ∑
i∈G
τi = N
2. (16)
Another important quantity is the remeeting time τ (n) from the two ends
of an n-step random walk started from stationarity:
τ (n) =
∑
i,j∈G
p
(n)
ij τij. (17)
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The τ (n) satisfy the recurrence relation
τ (n+1) = τ (n) +
1
N
∑
i∈G
p
(n)
ii τi − 1. (18)
Using Eqs. (16) and (18), and recalling the absence of self-loops (p
(1)
ii = 0),
we obtain
τ (0) = 0 (19)
τ (1) = N − 1 (20)
τ (2) = N − 2 (21)
τ (3) = N +
1
N
∑
i∈G
τip
(2)
ii − 3. (22)
Defining the effective degree κ˜ as
κ˜ =
∑
i∈G τi∑
i∈G τiκ
−1
i
= N2
(∑
i
τiκ
−1
i
)−1
= N2
(∑
i
τip
(2)
ii
)−1
,
we can rewrite Eq. (22) as
τ (3) = N +N/κ˜− 3. (23)
B.3 Conditions for success: Death-Birth
We will first consider the donation game
( A B
A b− c −c
B b 0
)
, (24)
in which type A pays a cost c to give a benefit b to its partner. We will
extend our results to the general game (10) in Section B.5. For the donation
game (24), the payoff to vertex i can be written
fi = −cxi + bx(1)i , (25)
where x
(1)
i =
∑
j wijxj is the average type among neighbors of i.
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To determine the condition for A to be favored for death-birth updating,
we compute
〈∆′〉 = 1
N2
∑
i∈G
〈
xi
(
fi − f (2)i
)〉
=
1
N2
∑
i∈G
(
−c
〈
xi
(
xi − x(2)i
)〉
+ b
〈
xi
(
x
(1)
i − x(3)i
)〉)
.
Applying Eqs. (12), (14) and (17), we obtain the condition
− cτ (2) + b (τ (3) − τ (1)) > 0. (26)
Now using Eqs. (20)–(22), we find that A is favored under weak selection if
and only if
− c(N − 2) + b (N/κ˜− 2) > 0. (27)
B.4 Conditions for success: Birth-Death
For birth-death updating, we compute
〈∆′〉 = 1
N2
∑
i∈G
〈
xi
(
fi − f (1)i
)〉
=
1
N2
∑
i∈G
(
−c
〈
xi
(
xi − x(1)i
)〉
+ b
〈
xi
(
x
(1)
i − x(2)i
)〉)
.
Applying Eqs. (12), (14) and (17) yields the condition
− cτ (1) + b (τ (2) − τ (1)) > 0. (28)
Substituting from Eqs. (20)–(22), we obtain that A is favored under weak
selection if and only if
− c(N − 1)− b > 0. (29)
B.5 Extension to arbitrary 2× 2 games
We turn now to the general 2 × 2 game (10). The Structure Coefficient
Theorem [48] states that, for a general class of evolutionary game theory
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processes, including the process considered here, the condition for success
under weak selection takes the form
σa+ b > c+ σd, (30)
for some structure coefficient σ that is independent of the game matrix. Let
us set C = −(a+b−c−d) and B = a−b+c−d. Note that, for the donation
game, C = c and B = b. Condition (30) now becomes equivalent to
− (σ + 1)C + (σ − 1)B > 0. (31)
It follows that the condition for success must be expressible in the form
−CK1 +BK2 > 0,
where K1 and K2 are independent of the game matrix and are unique up to
a common positive multiple. We may therefore replace c and b by C and B,
respectively, in Conditions (27) and (29).
C Bounds on remeeting times
Here we derive upper and lower bounds on the remeeting time τi from a
single vertex, in terms of the spectral gap g. These will be used to obtain
bounds on the effective degree κ˜.
C.1 Background on hitting times
For a single random walk on G, let hij denote the expected hitting time
to vertex j when starting from vertex i. These hitting times satisfy the
recurrence equations {
hij = 1 +
∑
k wikhkj for i 6= j,
hii = 0 for all i.
(32)
Since the stationary distribution on isothermal graphs is uniform, it follows
from the return-time identity (e.g. [33, Lemma 2.5]) that the expected time
for a random walk to return to its initial vertex is N , regardless of which
initial vertex is used. Combining with Eq. (32), we have the identity
1 +
∑
k
wikhik = N. (33)
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Let h∗j = 1N
∑
i hij denote the expected hitting time to j from a vertex
chosen uniformly at random. Corollary 3.14 of Ref. [33] gives the identity
hij − h∗j = hji − h∗i. (34)
Proposition 3.17 of Ref. [33] gives bounds on h∗j in terms of the spectral
gap. In the case of an isothermal graph with no self-loops, these bounds are
(N − 1)2
N
≤ h∗j ≤ N − 1
g
. (35)
C.2 Spectral gap bounds on remeeting times
We apply the bound (35) to obtain bounds on the remeeting times τi.
Theorem. For each i ∈ G,
2N − N − 1
g
− 2N − 1
N
≤ τi ≤ N − 1
g
+
2N − 1
N
. (36)
We note that the lower bound in Eq. (36) is not necessarily positive.
Proof. Our proof is a variation on the proof of Proposition 14.5 of Ref. [33].
Consider the process of two random walkers (Xt, Yt)
∞
t=0 described in Section
B.2, where both walkers start at vertex i: (X0, Y0) = (i, i). We define the
real-valued stochastic process (St)
∞
t=0 by
St =
{
N − h∗i t = 0
t+ hXtYt − h∗Yt t ≥ 1
(37)
Eqs. (32), (33), and (34) imply that St for 0 ≤ t ≤ M+ii is a Martingale. We
then have
N − h∗i = S0
= E[SM+ii ] by the Optional Stopping Theorem [52]
= E[M+ii ]− E
[
h∗Y
M+
ii
]
by the construction of St
= τi − E
[
h∗Y
M+
ii
]
by definition of τi.
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Rearranging,
τi = N − h∗i + E
[
h∗Y
M+
ii
]
. (38)
The upper bound on τi is obtained by applying the lower bound of (35) to
the second term of Eq. (38), and the upper bound of (35) to the third term
of Eq. (38). Applying these bounds in the opposite fashion gives the lower
bound on τi.
We note that the average of the upper and lower bounds in (36) is N ,
which is equal to the average value of τi according to Eq. (16). We also
observe that as N → ∞, the lower and upper bounds are asymptotically
N(2 − g−1) + O(1) and Ng−1 + O(1), respectively. Thus, in the N → ∞
limit, the lower bound is relevant (i.e., positive) for g > 1/2.
D Bounds on the effective degree
D.1 Quantile bounds for an arbitrary isothermal graph
Recall that κ˜ is a weighted harmonic average of the Simpson degrees κi.
The weights τi are bounded by Eq. (36). Upper and lower bounds on κ˜ can
therefore be obtained by placing the maximum weight on vertices that have
the largest or smallest Simpson degrees, respectively, taking into account
that the sum of the τi is constrained by Eq. (16).
To formalize this idea, we introduce the quantity
gˆ =
(
N − 1
Ng
+
2N − 1
N2
)−1
, (39)
so that the bounds (36) become
N(2− gˆ−1) ≤ τi ≤ Ngˆ−1. (40)
We note that gˆ = g + O(N−1) as N → ∞, and also that gˆ > g as long as
g < 1/2.
We write the effective degree of G in the form
κ˜ =
(∑
i∈G
( τi
N2
)
κ−1i
)−1
. (41)
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By Eqs. (16) and (36), the weights, τi/N
2, are subject to the constraints
τi
N2
≤ 1
Ngˆ
,
∑
i∈G
τi
N2
= 1. (42)
Next we index the vertices in order of increasing Simpson degree, so that
κ1 ≤ κ2 ≤ · · · ≤ κN . (43)
We define H[0,gˆ][κ] to be the harmonic average over the fraction gˆ of vertices
with the smallest Simpson degree:
H[0,gˆ][κ] =
 1
Ngˆ
bNgˆc∑
i=1
κ−1i +
(
1− bNgˆc
Ngˆ
)
κ−1bNgˆc+1
−1 . (44)
Above, bNgˆc denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to Ngˆ (i.e. the
floor function of Ngˆ). In Eq. (44), the bNgˆc vertices with the smallest
Simpson degree are each given weight 1/(Ngˆ). The remainder of the weight
is placed on the vertex with next-smallest Simpson degree κbNgˆc+1, so that
the total weights sum to one.
Similarly, we define H[1−gˆ,1][κ] to be the harmonic average over the fraction
gˆ of vertices with the largest Simpson degree:
H[1−gˆ,1][κ] =
(1− bNgˆc
Ngˆ
)
κ−1N−bNgˆc +
1
Ngˆ
N∑
i=N−bNgˆc+1
κ−1i
−1 . (45)
H[0,gˆ][κ] and H[1−gˆ,1][κ] represent the smallest and largest values, respec-
tively, of the right-hand side of Eq. (41) that are achievable under the con-
straints (42). We therefore have
H[0,gˆ][κ] ≤ κ˜ ≤ H[1−gˆ,1][κ]. (46)
D.2 Isothermal expander graphs
We now consider a sequence of isothermal graphs {Gj}∞j=1 with corresponding
sizes Nj and spectral gaps gj. We define this to be a sequence of isothermal
expander graphs if limj→∞Nj = ∞ and lim infj→∞ gj > 0. By passing to a
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subsequence if necessary, we can assume limj→∞ gj = g > 0. Notice that this
also entails limN→∞ gˆj = g.
To obtain limiting values of the bounds (46) for such a sequence, we turn
the degree sequence (43) for graph Gj into a quantile function—a nonde-
creasing piecewise-constant function κj(x), defined for 0 < x ≤ 1. Let κi,j
denote the ith smallest Simpson degree among the vertices of Gj. We then
define κj(x) = κdNjxe,j, where d e denotes the ceiling function. Eqs. (44) and
(45) can then be rewritten as
H[0,gˆj ][κj] =
(
gˆ−1j
∫ gˆj
0
(
κj(x)
)−1
dx
)−1
(47)
H[1−gˆj ,1][κj] =
(
gˆ−1j
∫ 1
1−gˆj
(
κj(x)
)−1
dx
)−1
. (48)
Now suppose that as j → ∞, κj(x) converges pointwise to some real-
valued function κ(x) on the interval [0, 1). Then κ(x) is the quantile function
of the limiting Simpson degree distribution. That is, a fraction x of the
Simpson degrees lie below κ(x), for each 0 ≤ x < 1. We allow for the
possibility that limx→1 κ(x) =∞.
As j →∞, the integrals in Eqs. (47)–(48) converge to
H[0,g][κ] ≤ κ˜ ≤ H[1−g,1][κ], (49)
with the limiting bounds given by
H[0,g][κ] =
(
g−1
∫ g
0
(
κ(x)
)−1
dx
)−1
(50)
H[1−g,1][κ] =
(
g−1
∫ 1
1−g
(
κ(x)
)−1
dx
)−1
. (51)
Convergence is guaranteed by the Dominated Convergence Theorem, using
the fact that 0 <
(
κj(x)
)−1 ≤ 1 for all j ≥ 1 and all x ∈ [0, 1).
D.3 Arithmetic and harmonic mean bounds
We can also obtain simpler, but looser, bounds that depend only on the
arithmetic and harmonic mean Simpson degree. We begin with a single
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isothermal graph G. For a lower bound, using inequality (40), we have
κ˜ =
(∑
i∈G
τi
N2
κ−1i
)−1
≥
(
1
Ngˆ
∑
i∈G
κ−1i
)−1
= gˆκH, (52)
where κH denotes the (unweighted) harmonic average Simpson degree.
For the upper bound, we have the following series of inequalities:
H[1−gˆ,1][κ] ≤ A[1−gˆ,1][κ] ≤ 1
gˆ
κA. (53)
Above, A[1−gˆ,1][κ] is the arithmetic average of the fraction gˆ of Simpson de-
grees that are the largest, defined similarly to H[1−gˆ,1][κ]. κA = A[0,1][κ] is
the average Simpson degree over all vertices. The first inequality in (53) is
the arithmetic-harmonic means inequality, while the second reflects the fact
that 1
gˆ
κA can be obtained by adding additional positive terms to the sum in
A[1−gˆ,1][κ].
Combining (49), (52), and (53), we have
gˆκH ≤ κ˜ ≤ κA
gˆ
. (54)
Turning now to a sequence of isothermal expander graphs {Gj}∞j=1, the
bounds (54) converge to
gκH ≤ κ˜ ≤ κA
g
. (55)
We note that, for any given graph with spectral gap g < 1/2, the bounds
(54) are stronger than (55), since gˆ > g in this case. We also note that κA
may diverge as j →∞; thus the upper bound in (55) may be infinite.
D.4 Sharper bounds for large spectral gap
In the case that the lower bound on τi in (40) is positive, we can further
sharpen the bounds on the effective degree by assigning one bound in (40)
to the lower half of Simpson degrees and the other bound to the upper half.
More precisely, suppose the vertices are ordered as in (43). Then a lower
bound is given by
κ˜ ≥
 gˆ−1
N
N/2∑
i=1
κ−1i +
2− gˆ−1
N
N∑
i=N/2+1
κ−1i
−1 , (56)
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if N is even, and
κ˜ ≥
 gˆ−1
N
(N−1)/2∑
i=1
κ−1i +
κ−1(N+1)/2
N
+
2− gˆ−1
N
N∑
i=(N+3)/2
κ−1i
−1 . (57)
if N is odd. Similarly, for an upper bound, we have
κ˜ ≤
2− gˆ−1
N
N/2∑
i=1
κ−1i +
gˆ−1
N
N∑
i=N/2+1
κ−1i
−1 , (58)
if N is even, and
κ˜ ≤
2− gˆ−1
N
(N−1)/2∑
i=1
κ−1i +
κ−1(N+1)/2
N
+
gˆ−1
N
N∑
i=(N+3)/2
κ−1i
−1 . (59)
if N is odd.
If we now consider a family of isothermal expander graphs {Gj}∞j=1 as in
the previous section, with limiting spectral gap g > 0 and limiting degree se-
quence described by the real-valued function κ(x), the corresponding bounds
on the effective degree converge to(
1
2g
κ¯−1low +
(
1− 1
2g
)
κ¯−1high
)−1
≤ κ˜ ≤
((
1− 1
2g
)
κ¯−1low +
1
2g
κ¯−1high
)−1
,
(60)
where κ¯low = H[0, 12 ]
[κ] and κ¯high = H[ 12 ,1]
[κ] are the harmonic averages of the
smaller and larger half of Simpson degrees, respectively. Bounds (60) can
also be written as
2gκ¯lowκ¯high
(2g − 1)κ¯low + κ¯high ≤ κ˜ ≤
2gκ¯lowκ¯high
κ¯low + (2g − 1)κ¯high . (61)
E Power-law graphs
Let us now suppose that, for a family of isothermal expander graphs with
limiting spectral gap g > 0, the Simpson degree distribution converges to
the power-law density f(κ) = (γ − 1)κγ−10 κ−γ, valid for κ ∈ [κ0,∞), with
exponent γ ≥ 2.
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E.1 Quantile bounds
To apply the bounds (49), we must determine the quantile function κ(x).
For this we solve the equation
x = (γ − 1)κγ−10
∫ y
κ0
κ−γ dκ
= 1− (y/κ0)1−γ.
Solving for y yields the quantile function:
κ(x) = y = κ0(1− x)1/(1−γ). (62)
Now we calculate
H[0,g][κ] =
(
g−1
∫ κ(g)
κ0
f(κ)κ−1dκ
)−1
=
(
g−1(γ − 1)κγ−10
∫ κ0(1−g)1/(1−γ)
κ0
κ−γ−1 dκ
)−1
=
(
κ0γ
γ − 1
)
g
1− (1− g)γ/(γ−1) .
(63)
Similarly,
H[1−g,1][κ] =
(
g−1
∫ ∞
κ(1−g)
f(κ)κ−1
)−1
=
(
g−1(γ − 1)κγ−10
∫ ∞
κ0g1/(1−γ)
κ−γ−1
)−1
=
κ0γ
γ − 1g
−1/(γ−1).
(64)
Thus we have the bounds(
γ
γ − 1
)
κ0g
1− (1− g)γ/(γ−1) ≤
(
b
c
)∗
≤
(
γ
γ − 1
)
κ0g
−1/(γ−1). (65)
Note that for all γ > 1, as g → 1, both bounds approach the harmonic
mean Simpson degree, which is κH = κ0γ/(γ − 1).
32
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
2
4
6
8
10
κH=2
Spectral gap, g
E
ffe
ct
iv
e
de
gr
ee
,κ˜
γ=2
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
2
4
6
8
10
κH=3/2
Spectral gap, g
E
ffe
ct
iv
e
de
gr
ee
,κ˜ γ=3
A B
Figure 6: Upper and lower bounds on the effective degree for graphs with
power-law distribution of Simpson degrees: f(κ) ∝ κ−γ, for κ ∈ [1,∞). For
g < 1/2 we use the bounds (65), while for g > 1/2 we use the sharper bounds
(66), showing also the bounds (65) for comparison.
E.2 Sharper bounds for g > 1/2
In the case g > 1/2, we can use the bounds (61). From Eqs. (63) and (64),
we have
κ¯low =
γκ0
2(γ − 1)(1− 2−γ/(γ−1)) ,
κ¯high =
γκ0
2(γ − 1)2−γ/(γ−1) .
This leads to(
γ
γ − 1
)
gκ0
2g − 1 + (1− g)2−1/(γ−1) ≤
(
b
c
)∗
≤
(
γ
γ − 1
)
gκ0
1− (1− g)2−1/(γ−1) .
(66)
Figure 6 illustrates these bounds for γ = 2 and γ = 3, both with κ0 = 1. In
both cases, the improvement over bounds (65) is relatively small.
F Island model
Here we describe an island model in which multiple isothermal graphs are
joined together by weak links (Fig. 1D of the main text). We begin with n sep-
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arate isothermal graphs (“islands”)G1, . . . , Gn, of respective sizesN1, . . . , Nn.
Each individual island is vertex-transitive, but the size and graph structure
may vary across islands. Since each island is vertex-transitive, all vertices of
a given island Gx have the same Simpson degree κx (but the κx may differ
of across islands).
The islands are joined into an overall isothermal graph G by adding an
edge of weight α  1 between each pair of vertices on different islands.
To maintain a weighted degree of one, the edges within each island Gx are
rescaled by the factor 1− α(N −Nx).
Since each island is vertex-transitive, and each inter-island pair is equally
connected (by weight α), the coalescence time τij from different islands Gx
and Gy depends only on x and y, and not on the particular vertices i ∈ Gx
and j ∈ Gy. Accordingly, we let τGxGy denote the meeting time between a
vertex of Gx and a vertex of Gy, y 6= x.
From Eq. (13) we have the following recurrence for coalescence times. For
a pair i 6= j on a common island Gx, we have
τij = 1 +
1
2
(1− α(N −Nx))
∑
k∈Gx
(wikτjk + wjkτik) +
∑
y 6=x
αNyτGxGy . (67)
For inter-island meeting times, we have that for x 6= y,
τGxGy = 1 +
α
2Nx
∑
i,j∈Gy
τij +
α
2Ny
∑
i,j∈Gx
τij
+
α
2
∑
z /∈{x,y}
Nz
(
τGzGy + τGxGz
)
+
(
1− (N −Nx)α
2
− (N −Ny)α
2
)
τGxGy . (68)
We seek an asymptotic solution as α→ 0. As an ansatz, we suppose{
τij = O(1) for i 6= j and i, j ∈ Gx for some x,
τGxGy = Txyα
−1 +O(1) for x 6= y, (69)
for some collection of values Txy. Substituting in Eq. (68) and taking α→ 0,
we find that the Txy satisfy
2N −Nx −Ny
2
Txy = 1 +
1
2
∑
z /∈{x,y}
Nz(Txz + Tyz). (70)
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Defining Txx = 0 for all x = 1, . . . , n, we can rewrite Eq. (70) as
NTxy = 1 +
1
2
n∑
z=1
Nz(Txz + Tyz). (71)
We have not found a general closed-form solution to Eq. (71). However, if
there are n = 2 islands, or if all islands have the same size N/n, the solution
is Txy = n/N for all pairs x, y with x 6= y.
Taking α→ 0 in Eq. (67) yields
τij = 1 +
n∑
y=1
NyTxy +
1
2
∑
k∈Gx
(wikτjk + wjkτik). (72)
This is the same as the recurrence (13) for coalescence times on island Gx
alone, except the time increment is 1 +
∑
y 6=xNyTxy instead of 1. It follows
that, when the islands are joined to form the overall graph G, all coalescence
times from pairs i, j ∈ Gx are scaled by the factor 1 +
∑n
y=1NyTxy. This
scaling applies to remeeting times as well, so that if τˆi is the remeeting time
from vertex i on graph Gx alone, the remeeting time from i on the overall
graph G is
τi =
(
1 +
n∑
y=1
NyTxy
)
τˆi.
We check this solution by computing the overall sum of remeeting times,
which should equal N2 by Eq. (16):
∑
i∈G
τi =
n∑
x=1
(
1 +
n∑
y=1
NyTxy
)∑
i∈Gx
τˆi
=
n∑
x=1
(
1 +
n∑
y=1
NyTxy
)
N2x
=
n∑
x=1
N2x +
∑
x,y
N2xNyTxy. (73)
To show this is equal to N2, we multiply Eq. (71) by NxNy and sum over all
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pairs x, y with x 6= y:
N
∑
x,y
x 6=y
NxNyTxy =
∑
x,y
x6=y
NxNy +
1
2
∑
x,y,z
x 6=y
NxNyNz(Txz + Tyz)
N
∑
x,y
NxNyTxy = N −
n∑
x=1
N2x +
1
2
∑
x,y,z
NxNyNz(Txz + Tyz)−
∑
x,z
N2xNzTxz
= N −
n∑
x=1
N2x +N
∑
x,y
NxNyTxy −
∑
x,y
N2xNyTxy.
This yields the identity
∑
x,y
N2xNyTxy = N
2 −
n∑
x=1
N2x . (74)
Substituting in Eq. (73) yields
∑
i∈G τi = N
2 as desired.
We compute the effective degree κ˜ of G as
κ˜ = N2
(
n∑
x=1
∑
i∈Gx
τiκ
−1
i
)−1
= N2
(
n∑
x=1
(
1 +
n∑
y=1
NyTxy
)
κ−1x
∑
i∈Gx
τˆi
)−1
= N2
(
n∑
x=1
(
1 +
n∑
y=1
NyTxy
)
N2xκ
−1
x
)−1
.
So the effective degree κ˜ is a weighted harmonic average of the Simpson de-
grees on the separate islands, with each κx weighted byN
2
x
(
1 +
∑n
y=1NyTxy
)
.
In the case that all islands have equal size, (Nx = N/n for all x), the
islands are weighted equally. For n = 2 islands (not necessarily of equal
size), substituting the solution T12 = 2/N to Eq. (71), we obtain
κ˜ = N2
(
N21 (1 + 2N2/N)κ
−1
1 +N
2
2 (1 + 2N1/N)κ
−1
2
)
= N3
(
N21 (N1 + 3N2)κ
−1
1 +N
2
2 (3N1 +N2)κ
−1
2
)−1
.
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G Wheel graph
The isothermal wheel graph (Fig. 1B of the main text) has n wheel vertices
and one hub. Neighboring wheel vertices are joined by edges of weight (n−
1)/(2n), and each wheel vertex is joined to the hub by an edge of weight
1/n. Let τL,j denote the coalescence time for two leaves that are j apart,
0 ≤ j ≤ n. Clearly, τL,0 = τL,n = 0. Let τLH denote the coalescence time
between a leaf and the hub.
Recurrence relation (13) for coalescence times becomes
τL,j = 1 +
n− 1
2n
(τL,j−1 + τL,j+1) +
1
n
τLH for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, (75)
τLH = 1 +
n− 1
2n
τLH +
1
2n
n−1∑
j=0
τL,j. (76)
For convenience, we define τ ′L,j = τL,j − τLH . Then Eqs. (75)–(76) become
τ ′L,j = 1 +
n− 1
2n
(
τ ′L,j−1 + τ
′
L,j+1
)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, (77)
τLH = 2n+
n−1∑
j=0
τ ′L,j. (78)
As an ansatz, we suppose the solution to Eq. (77) takes the form
τ ′L,j = a+ b
(
γj + γn−j
)
, (79)
for some a, b, γ depending on n but not on j. Substituting into Eq. (77) gives
a+ b
(
γj + γn−j
)
= 1 +
n− 1
2n
(
2a+ b
(
γj−1 + γn−j+1 + γj+1 + γn−j−1
))
= 1 +
n− 1
2n
(
2a+ b
(
γ + γ−1
) (
γj + γn−j
))
.
For this to hold for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 necessitates that
a = 1 +
n− 1
n
a and (n− 1) (γ + γ−1) = 2n.
Solving the above equations yields a = n and
γ =
n−√2n− 1
n− 1 , γ
−1 =
n+
√
2n− 1
n− 1 .
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To solve for b, we substitute into Eq. (78),
τLH = 2n+
n−1∑
j=0
(
n+ b
(
γj + γn−j
))
= n(n+ 2) + b
(1 + γ)(1− γn)
1− γ . (80)
Additionally, since τL,0 = 0, we have
τLH = −τ ′L,0 = −n− b(1 + γn). (81)
Combining Eqs. (80) and (81) and solving for b yields
b = −n(n+ 3)
2
(
1− γ
1− γn+1
)
.
Substituting this value of b into Eqs. (81) and (79), we obtain the coales-
cence times
τLH =
n(n+ 3)
2
(
(1− γ)(1 + γn)
1− γn+1
)
− n,
τL,j = τ
′
L,j + τLH
=
n(n+ 3)
2
(
(1− γ)(1− γj)(1− γn−j)
1− γn+1
)
.
In particular, for neighboring leaves (j = 1), we have
τL,1 =
n(n+ 3)
2
(
(1− γ)2(1− γn−1)
1− γn+1
)
. (82)
Turning now to remeeting times, we compute
τH = 1 + τLH
=
n(n+ 3)
2
(
(1− γ)(1 + γn)
1− γn+1
)
− (n− 1),
τL = 1 +
1
n
τLH +
n−1
n
τL,1
=
n+ 3
2
(
(1− γ)(n(1 + γn)− (n− 1)(γ + γn−1))
1− γn+1
)
.
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The Simpson degrees are
κH = n, κL =
(
2
(n− 1)2
4n2
+
1
n2
)−1
=
2n2
(n− 1)2 + 2 .
Using the above values, the effective degree can be calculated as
κ˜ =
(n+ 1)2
τHκ
−1
H + nτLκ
−1
L
. (83)
Asymptotically, as n→∞, we have
τH ∼ n
√
n√
2
, κH ∼ n, τL ∼ n, κL ∼ 2,
where f(n) ∼ g(n) means that limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) = 1. (The asymptotic
expressions for τH and τL were obtained with the aid of Mathematica.) Sub-
stituting into Eq. (83) and simplifying gives limn→∞ κ˜ = 2.
H Numerical experiments for power-law net-
works
We have computed the effective degree κ˜ and critical B/C ratio for two
families of random graphs on N = 200 nodes: (a) power-law generated via
the configuration model, (b) preferential attachment.
For the configuration model, we first generated a degree sequence by
rounding down a sequence of random reals chosen from the interval [k(γ −
2)/(γ − 1),∞) according to a γ-exponent power-law distribution. Then we
generated a random graph with the given degree sequence using the standard
configuration model.
For the preferential attachment graphs, we start from a complete graph
of size (m + 1), and add vertices one at a time. Each new vertex con-
nects to exactly m distinct previous vertices, with probability proportional
to (degree + m(γ − 3)). This procedure grows a power-law network with
exponent γ and mean degree k = 2m [41, 42].
For each graph topology we generated, we found an isothermal weighting
consistent with this topology by numerically solving a quadratic program to
minimize
∑
i,j w
2
ij under the constraint
∑
j wij = 1 for all i. (“Consistent
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with this topology” means that only the edges that are present in the given
topology are allowed to have nonzero weights.) The sum-of-squares mini-
mization achieves a weighting as uniform as possible, and avoids biasing the
results in favor of cooperation.
In both cases we let the asymptotic average degree, k = 2m, range from
6 to 24 in increments of 2, and the power-law exponent γ from 2.05 to 3 in
increments of 0.05. For each parameter combination, 10 random graphs were
generated, for a total of 2000 graphs in each ensemble.
For some topologies, an isothermal weighting may not exist. For instance,
if a set L of low-degree nodes happen to be only connected to the same subset
H of hubs, and |L| > |H|, then it is clear that there cannot be an isothermal
weighting. Such configurations arise with non-negligible probability for small
values of γ. We removed such graphs from the ensemble. Consequently, the
resulting sample does not have the same number of graphs in each category.
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